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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I examine the international welfare effects of
monetary policy. I develop a New Keynesian two-country model,
where  central  banks  in  both  countries  follow  the  Taylor  rule.  I
show that a decrease in the domestic interest rate, under producer
currency pricing, is a beggar-thyself policy that reduces domestic
welfare and increases foreign welfare in the short term, regardless
of whether the cross-country substitutability is high or low. In the
medium term, it is a beggar-thy-neighbour (beggar-thyself) policy,
if the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied (violated). Under local
currency pricing, a decrease in the domestic interest rate is a
beggar-thy-neighbour policy in the short term, but a beggar-
thyself policy in the medium term. Both under producer and local
currency pricing, a monetary expansion increases world welfare in
the short term, but reduces it in the medium term.
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1 Introduction
Monetary policies of the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) and the European Cen-
tral Bank have notable consequences, not only on their own economies but
also on the rest of the world. The Fed implemented a monetary expansion
after the 2001 recession, which lowered the short-term nominal interest rate
in 2003, at a time when output may have been quite close to its natural
level, by more than the Taylor rule suggested. After this, the Fed gradually
raised the interest rate to a level coinciding with the appropriate level of
interest rate, as implied by the Taylor rule (see Taylor 2009). Understanding
the international welfare e¤ects of this type of monetary policy is essential.
This paper analyses the international welfare e¤ects of monetary policy in a
situation where the central bank unexpectedly lowers the interest rate and
then gradually raises it back to the level implied by the Taylor rule.
Analysing the international welfare e¤ects of monetary policy has received
attention in the so-called New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM)
literature, pioneered by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 1996). This is hardly a
surprise, since one advantage of the NOEM framework is that it allows an
explicit utility-based welfare analysis of monetary policy. Obstfeld and Rogo¤
(1995) demonstrate that the benets of a domestic monetary expansion are
split equally between the home and foreign country. They focus on the
case where the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods
(cross-country substitutability, for short) is high, and export prices are set
in the producers currency (PCP, producer currency pricing).
The subsequent NOEM literature has shown that the international wel-
fare e¤ects of monetary shocks are predicated by the currency of export pric-
ing and the cross-country substitutability. Betts and Devereux (2000) show
that if export prices are set in the local currency of the consumer (LCP, local
currency pricing), a monetary expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
The reason is that the domestic country can improve its terms of trade at
the neighbours expense. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Tille (2001) show
that expansionary monetary policy is beggar-thyself if the cross-country sub-
stitutability is lower than the elasticity of substitution between two goods
produced in the same country (within-country substitutability, for short).
Also in this case, gains in domestic output are o¤set by deteriorating terms
of trade.
The studies of Betts and Devereux (2000), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001),
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) and Tille (2001) analyse only the overall welfare
e¤ect. That is, they focus exclusively on the discounted present value of the
change in utility. Engler and Tervala (2010) instead analyse the behaviour
of welfare over time. They show that the models of Corsetti and Pesenti
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(2001), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) and Tille (2001) in the end generate a
common result: A monetary expansion is a beggar-thyself policy in the short
term, regardless of whether the cross-country substitutability is equal to or
smaller than the within-country substitutability. On the other hand, in the
long term, it is a beggar-thyself policy only if the Marshall-Lerner condition
does not hold.
Vanhoose (2004) criticised the NOEM literature because it abstracted
from much that the eld of monetary economics has learned about monetary
policy modelling. On one hand, the revival of interest-rate rules, pioneered
by Taylor (1993) and Woodford (2003), have become an essential part of the
NOEM literature after Vanhoose wrote the critical appraisal. On the other
hand, in all above-mentioned studies that address the international welfare
e¤ects of monetary policy, a monetary expansion is a simple shock to the
money supply and the foreign country does not respond to it.
The main point of this paper is to analyse the international welfare e¤ects
of monetary policy in a case where the central banks in both countries follow
the Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing. Monetary expansion means a
negative shock to the domestic Taylor rule. Therefore, the domestic central
bank unexpectedly lowers the interest rate and gradually raises it to the level
implied by the Taylor rule. The central bank in the foreign country follows
the Taylor rule the whole time.
One of the main ndings of the paper is that the overall welfare e¤ects of
a decrease in the interest rate are completely the same in all models Engler
and Tervala (2010), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001)
and Tille (2001)  in which the money supply is permanently increased.
Therefore, a decrease in the interest rate can: (i) be a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy (in the case of LCP); (ii) be a beggar-thyself policy (in the case of PCP
with a low cross-country substitutability); or (iii) increase utility in both
countries (in the case of PCP with a high cross-country substitutability).
The international welfare e¤ects of monetary policy over time, however,
depend di¤erently on the currency of export pricing and the cross-country
substitutability than overall welfare e¤ects. In the short term, under PCP,
a monetary expansion always has a beggar-thyself e¤ect, regardless of the
size of the cross-country substitutability. In the medium term, however, a
monetary expansion has a beggar-thy-neighbour e¤ect if the Marshall-Lerner
condition holds, but a beggar-thyself e¤ect if the Marshall-Lerner condition
does not hold.1 In addition, a monetary expansion has, in the medium term,
1The Marshall-Lerner condition is that the sum of the elasticities of demand for exports
and imports exceed one in absolute value. Under certain assumptions, this is the condition
for a depreciation to improve the trade balance (Deardor¤ 2011).
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a beggar-thyself e¤ect under LCP, although short-term and overall e¤ects are
beggar-thy-neighbour. On the other hand, the welfare e¤ects of monetary
policy on world welfare is not sensitive to the currency of export pricing
and the cross-country substitutability: monetary expansion always increases
world utility in the short term and reduces it in the medium term.
Bluedorn and Bowdler (2011) analyse empirically the e¤ects of a contrac-
tionary U.S. monetary policy shock on U.S and non-U.S. G7 countries. Their
main ndings are as follows. First, it induces an impact appreciation of the
dollar that is followed by a gradual return roughly to the initial level. Second,
there is positive interest rate pass-through from the U.S. to the non-U.S. G7
countries. U.S. monetary policy, however, creates deviations from uncovered
interest rate parity (UIP). Third, U.S. output response is negative, while
non-U.S. G7 countriesoutput shows a mixed initial response (some positive
and some negative). In the short term, the PCP version of the present model
is able to capture all of these open economy consequences of U.S. monetary
policy. Non-U.S. G7 countries might have di¤erent cross-country elasticities
with the United States, which might explain some positive and some negative
foreign output responses.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model
where all PCP is used. Section 3 discusses the international transmission
e¤ects of monetary policy in the PCP case. Section 4 presents the LCP
version of the model and analyses the international transmission e¤ects of
monetary policy in the LCP case. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
In this section, I develop a New-Keynesian open-economy model character-
ized by imperfect competition and nominal rigidities. The main modelling
innovation relative to the previous studies that have analysed the welfare
e¤ects of monetary policy in open economies Betts and Devereux (2000),
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Engler and Tervala (2010), Obstfeld and Rogo¤
(1995) and Tille (2001) is the introduction of the Taylor rule, which central
banks in both countries follow. Therefore, monetary shocks are modelled as
a shock to the interest rate rule, rather than a simple shock to the money
supply.
The use of the Taylor rule implies that the model must be stationary.
There are a number of ways to render an open economy model (with incom-
plete but integrated nancial markets) stationary (see Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe 2003). To render the present model stationary, following Bergin (2006)
and Cenesis and Pierdzioch (2010), I extended UIP by the introduction of a
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risk premium term that is a function of the level of net foreign debt. This
forces wealth allocations in the long term to return to their initial levels.
The world economy consists of two countries: home and foreign. There
is a continuum of rms and households that are indexed by z 2 [0; 1]. The
fraction of domestic (foreign) rms and household is n (1   n). Each rm
produces a di¤erentiated good, and nominal price rigidity is introduced by
the mechanism proposed by Calvo (1983). In the rst version of the model,
I restrict the attention to the PCP case. In section 4, I extend the model by
assuming LCP. In the description of the model that follows, in the cases in
which the equations are symmetric across countries, I only discuss domestic
equations.
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Preferences
All households have identical preferences. The intertemporal utility function
of the representative domestic household can be written as
Ut (z) =
1X
s=t
s t
"
logCs   (`s (z))
2
2
#
; (1)
where  is the discount factor, Ct is a consumption index (dened below)
and `t(z) denotes labour supply. The overall consumption index takes the
following form
Ct =
h
n
1
 (Cht )
 1
 + (1  n) 1 (Cft )
 1

i 
 1
; (2)
where Cht (C
f) is an index of domestic (foreign) goods and  > 0 measures
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Using the
terminology of Tille (2001), I refer to  as the cross-country substitutabil-
ity. Consumption of domestic cht (z) and foreign c
f
t (z) goods and are CES
aggregates of the di¤erent brands of domestic and foreign goods
Cht =
24n  1 nZ
o
(Cht (z))
 1
 dz
35  1 ; Cft =
24(1  n)  1 1Z
n
(Cft (z))
 1
 dz
35

 1
;
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in the
same country. Using the terminology of Tille (2001), I refer to  as the
within-country substitutability.
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Given the consumption indexes, the optimal allocation of consumption
between di¤erent types of goods is governed by the following equations:
Cht (z) =

pht (z)
P ht
  
P ht
Pt
 
Ct; C
f
t (z) =
"
pft (z)
P ft
#  "
P ft
Pt
# 
Ct;
Cht (z) =

pht (z)
P ht
  "P hy
P t
# 
Ct ; C
f
t (z) =
"
pft (z)
P ft
#  "
P ft
P t
# 
Ct :
In these equations, asterisks indicate consumption by the representative for-
eign households. This means that Cht (z) (C
f
t (z)) denotes consumption of
the di¤erentiated domestic (foreign) good by the representative foreign house-
hold.
The domestic currency price of domestic and foreign goods are denoted by
pht (z) and p
f
t (z) respectively. P
h
t and P
f
t (dened below) are respectively the
price indexes corresponding to domestic and foreign consumption baskets
Cht (z) and C
f
t (z), and Pt (dened below) is the domestic consumer price
index. All these price indexes are expressed in domestic currency terms.
Corresponding foreign currency price indexes are denoted by an asterisk.
For instance, pht (z) and p
f
t (z) are respectively the foreign currency price of
domestic and foreign goods.
The domestic price indexes are given by
P ht =

n 1
Z n
0
pht (z)
1  dz
 1
1 
; P ft =

(1  n) 1
Z 1
n
pft (z)
1  dz
 1
1 
Pt =
h
n(P ht )
1  + (1  n)(P ft )1 
i 1
1 
: (3)
The corresponding foreign indexes are dened in an analogous way.
The law of one price holds for each good: pht (z) = Stp
h
t (z), where S is
the nominal exchange rate (the domestic currency price of foreign currency).
This implies that the purchasing power parity (PPP) holds: Pt = StP t .
2.1.2 Budget Constraints and the Structure of Financial Markets
Consider a cashless economy, where the only role for money is a unit of
account in which bonds, wages, prices and prots are expressed. The budget
constraint of the domestic representative household, in nominal terms, is
given by
Dt = (1 + it)Dt 1 + wt`t   PtCt + t: (4)
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Dt denotes bonds (that pay one unit of domestic currency in period t+1) held
at the beginning of period t; it is the nominal interest rate on bonds between
t   1 and t; w is the nominal wage paid to the household in a competitive
labour market; and  denotes the households share of the nominal prots
(dividends) of domestic rms. All domestic (foreign) households own an
equal share of all domestic (foreign) rms.
The structure of the foreign economy is identical to the domestic econ-
omy, with one di¤erence. The domestic bond, denominated in the domestic
currency, is the only internationally traded asset. The foreign bond (F ), de-
nominated in the foreign currency, is not traded internationally. Therefore,
foreign households can hold both domestic and foreign bond, while domestic
households can hold only domestic bonds.
The budget constraint of a representative foreign household is
Dt
St
+ F t = (1 + it)
Dt 1
St
+ (1 + it )F

t 1 + w

t `

t   P t Ct + t : (5)
The global asset-market-clearing condition for domestic bonds requires nDt+
(1 n)Dt = 0. In addition, since there is only one representative household in
the foreign country, the net supply of the foreign bond is zero in equilibrium.
The fact that foreign households must be indi¤erent between holding
domestic and foreign bonds leads to UIP. However, a common property of log-
linearized NOEM models, with incomplete but integrated nancial markets,
is that shocks can lead to permanent wealth reallocations between countries.
This induces nonstationarity and prevents the use of the Taylor rule.
One of the simplest ways to render the model stationary is to include
a risk premium to UIP. As emphasised by Bergin (2006), for instance, the
introduction of the "risk premium" term that is a function of the level of debt
forces wealth allocations in the long term to return to their initial levels. This
approach is used in this paper. As further emphasised by Bergin (2006), the
term can be interpreted as a risk premium, because this formulation implies
that lenders demand a higher rate of return on a country with a large debt
to compensate for perceived default risk.
The log-linear version of UIP with a risk premium ( ) can be written as
(1  )^{t = (1  )^{t + S^t+1   S^t    D^t; (6)
where percentage changes from the initial steady state (denoted by the sub-
script zero) are denoted by hats (for example {^t = dit=i0). This formulation
implies that there is a small cost that the household has to pay if its bond
holdings are not equal to their steady-state level (that is zero).
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2.1.3 Optimal Behaviour
The optimal behaviour of households is governed by the following equations:
Pt+1Ct+1 = (1 + it+1)PtCt; (7)
P t+1Ct+1 = (1 + i

t+1)P

t C

t ; (8)
`t =
wt
CtPt
; (9)
`t =
wt
Ct P t
: (10)
The rst-order conditions shown above are standard ones. Equations (7) and
(8) are the Euler equations for optimal domestic and foreign consumption,
respectively. Equations (9) and (10) show that householdsoptimal labour
supply is an increasing function of the real wage and a decreasing function
of consumption.
2.2 Monetary Policy
According to the Taylor rule, the central bank raises the nominal interest rate
if ination rises above the ination target or if output rises above potential
output. In this paper, in the absence of a growth path for the money supply,
the ination target is zero. As is standard in the New Keynesian literature,
I dene the output gap as the deviation of output from the equilibrium level
that would prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities. Therefore, in the
present model, the central bank responds directly to the deviation of output
from the initial steady state level.
Estimates of Taylor-type monetary policy rules typically nd a high de-
gree of interest rate smoothing. Therefore, I assume that the domestic central
bank follows the log-linear Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing (the for-
eign central bank follows an identical rule):
{^t = (1  1)(2Pt + 3y^t) + 1{^t 1 + i;t: (11)
In this equation, the coe¢ cients 1, 2 and 3 are non-negative and chosen
by the central banks. In addition,  denotes the rst di¤erence operator and
i;t is an unpredictable shift in the monetary policy rule.
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2.3 Firms
2.3.1 Prots
All rms produce a di¤erentiated good and the production function of the
representative domestic rm is
yt (z) = `t (z) ; (12)
where y (z) is the total output of rm z and ` (z) is the labour input used by
it.
The representative domestic rm maximizes prots
t (z) = pt (z) yt (z)  wt`t (z) ; (13)
taking into account the production function (13) and the demand curve for
it products
ydt (z) =

pht (z)
P ht
  
P ht
Pt
 
CWt ;
where CWt is the world demand (C
W
t = nCt + (1  n)Ct ). The rms prots
can therefore be written as
t (z) =

pht (z)
P ht
  
P ht
Pt
 
CWt
 
pht (z)  wt

: (14)
2.3.2 International Price Setting
In the absence of price rigidities, the representative domestic rm would
maximize its prots, specied in equation (14), using pht (z) as the choice
variable. This would imply that the optimal price is given by a simple mark-
up, determined by the within-country substitutability, over the marginal cost,
according to the formula
pht (z) =

   1wt: (15)
To model price rigidities, I follow the formulation of Calvo (1983). This
implies that each rm may reset its price in any given period with a proba-
bility 1   , independently of other rms and the amount of time since the
last adjustment. Therefore, in setting its price, each rm has to take into
account that there is a probability 0 <  < 1 in every subsequent period that
it will not be able to revise its price setting decision. When setting a new
price in period t, each rm maximises the present value of prots, weighting
future prots by the probability that the price will still be e¤ective in that
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period. Therefore, the representative rm seeks to maximise the discounted
value of expected real prots
max
pht (z)
Vt (z) = Et
1X
s=t
s tQt;s
s (z)
Ps
;
where E denotes the expectation operator and Qt;s is a stochastic discount
factor between period t and period s. The rms optimization problem results
in the following pricing rule:
pht (z) =


   1
 EtP1s=t s tQt;s CWsPs  1Phs   PhsPs  ws
Et
P1
s=t 
s tQt;s

CWs
Ps

1
Phs
  
Phs
Ps
 : (16)
The log-linear version of equation (16) can be written as
p^ht (z) = Etp^
h
t+1(z) + (1  )w^t;
so that the optimal price is the weighted average of the current and future
nominal marginal costs.
2.4 Symmetric Equilibrium
All rms in a country are symmetric, and every rm that decides to change its
price in any given period chooses the same price and output. The structure
of price setting implies that each period a fraction of rms (1  ) set a new
price and the remaining fraction keep their price unchanged.
The consolidated budget constraint of the home economy is derived by
using equations (4) and (13):2
PtCt;= p
h
t (z) yt (z) + (1 + it)Dt 1  Dt: (17)
The model is log-linearized around a symmetric steady state, where all
exogenous variables are constants and where initial net foreign assets are
zero. Equations (9), (12) and (15) imply that the initial level of employment
and output is given by
y0 = `0 =

   1

 1
2
:
Equilibrium is dened as sequences of variables that clear the labour,
goods and money markets in each country in each period and satisfy in-
tertemporal budget constraints and pricing rules.
2The corresponding foreign equation, taking into account the global asset-market-
clearing condition for domestic bonds (nDt+(1 n)Dt = 0) and that the net supply of the
foreign bond is zero in equilibrium, is P t C

t = p
f
t (z) y

t (z)  (1+ it 1) n1 n
Dt 1
St
+ n1 n
Dt
St
:
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2.5 Choice of Parameter Values
The rationale for the choice of parameter values is as follows. Periods are
interpreted as quarters and, therefore, the discount factor  is set to 0.99.
The two countries are assumed to be of equal size. Therefore, n is set to 0.5.
The price rigidity parameter  is set to 0.5, implying that the average time
until a new price is reset is two periods (six months). This is consistent with
the empirical ndings of Bils and Klenow (2004). The risk premium in UIP
( ) is set to 0.0004, based on the empirical estimates of Bergin (2006). The
within-country substitutability () is set to 6.
As shown in the earlier literature Tille (2001) and Engler and Tervala
(2010) the crucial parameter that governs the international welfare e¤ects of
monetary policy is the cross-country substitutability . In the basic setting, I
have set it to 6 so that it is equal to the within-country substitutability, as in
the Obstfeld- Rogo¤ (1995) model. This a natural benchmark to analyse the
implication of varying the cross-country substitutability. The most realistic
case is likely the one in which the cross-country substitutability is smaller
than the within-country substitutability. Therefore, I focus on the cases
where the cross-country substitutability parameter is smaller than the within
country one. Specically, I focus on the cases where  = 1 and  = 0:5.
Finally, the coe¢ cients in the Taylor rule have to be dened. The interest
rate smoothing parameter (1) is set to 0.8. This is consistent with the
empirical ndings of Clarida et al. (2000). Based on the original estimates
of Taylor (1993); 2 is set to 1:5 and 3 is set to 0:5=4.
3
3 Welfare E¤ects of Monetary Policy under
Producer Currency Pricing
3.1 Method of Welfare Analysis
The method of welfare analysis in this model is somewhat di¤erent than
in rst generation NOEM models, including Betts and Devereux (2000),
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996) and Tille (2001),
where all prices are xed for one period and the economy reaches the new
steady state after that period. In these models, the welfare e¤ect is the
short-term change in utility plus the discounted present value of the change
in steady-state utility. Because of staggered price setting, I evaluate welfare
changes as follows. First, I study changes in one periods utility. Then, I
3I solve the model using the algorithm developed by Klein (2000) and McCallum (2001).
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calculate the discounted present value (DPV) of the change in utility.4
Formally, the change in utility in period t is given by
dUt = C^t   `20 ^`t;
while an analogous expression holds for foreign utility. The DPV of the
change in utility is therefore calculated as
dUDPV =
1X
s=t
s tdUs;
with an equivalent expression holding for the foreign country. The change
in world utility is dened as the population weighted sum of the change in
domestic and foreign utility, as follows:
dUWi = ndUi + (1  n)dUi ;
where i = t;DPV .
Table 1: Welfare E¤ects of a Domestic Interest Rate Shock under PCP
dU1 dU

1 dU
W
1 dU6 dU6 dU
W
6 dUss dU

ss
 = 0:5 -0.0041 0.0078 0.0019 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0001 0 0
 = 1 -0.0075 0.011 0.0019 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 0 0
 = 3 -0.016 0.02 0.0019 0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0001 0 0
 = 6 -0.023 0.027 0.0019 0.0018 -0.019 -0.0001 0 0
Figures 14 illustrate the changes in the periods utility. Table 1 shows
these changes in the periods utility in the rst and sixth period and in the
steady state (SS). Table 2 shows the DPV of the change in utility.
Table 2: Discounted Present Value of the Change in Utility under PCP
dUDPV dU

DPV dU
W
DPV
 = 0:5 -0.02 0.024 0.0023
 = 1 -0.091 0.014 0.0023
 = 3 -0.0049 0.005 0.0023
 = 6 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023
4The same method is used in Ganelli and Tervala (2010) and Tervala (2010).
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3.2 Welfare E¤ects in the Basic Case
I begin by examining the dynamic e¤ects of -1% shock (i;1 =  1) to the
domestic monetary policy rule in the basic case, where the cross-country
substitutability is equal to the within-country substitutability ( =  = 6).
I will discuss how responsive the welfare e¤ects of monetary are to changes
the cross-country substitutability later in this paper.
Figure 1 (on page 26) shows the e¤ects of a decrease in the domestic
interest rate. In all gures, the vertical axes show percentage deviations
from the initial steady state, except for the change in bond holdings, which
are expressed as a deviation from initial consumption. The domestic terms of
trade are dened as the relative price of domestic exports in terms of imports.
The domestic terms of trade, therefore, worsen if this index falls. It is worth
mentioning that the economy has not yet reached the new steady state after
ten periods.
Panel (c) in Figure 1 shows that a decrease in the domestic interest rate
depreciates the nominal exchange rate. In the short and medium term, the
domestic interest rate is low relative to the foreign interest rate. UIP then
implies that this is only consistent with expected exchange rate appreciation.
Therefore, the exchange rate must overshoot its long-term level; it must
initially depreciate to a point where it will appreciate until it reaches the
steady-state level.
The depreciation of the nominal exchange rate raises the relative price of
foreign goods, shifting world demand toward domestic goods and away from
foreign goods. This traditional expenditure-switching e¤ect of a nominal
exchange rate change causes an increase in domestic output and a decrease
in foreign output, as long as prices are sticky, as shown in panel (a) of Figure
1.
The domestic monetary policy lowers the real interest rate and world con-
sumption increases in the short term. The consumption di¤erential between
countries, unlike in the Obstfeld-Rogo¤model, is not constant; it instead di-
minishes over time. The log-linear version of equation (8) can be subtracted
from equation (7), making use of PPP and UIP with a risk premium, yielding
C^t +  D^t   C^t = C^t+1   C^t+1:
The risk premium in UIP implies that real interest rates are not equal across
countries. Consumption growth, therefore, is not equated across countries.
However, since the risk premium is quite small, the households in both coun-
tries face almost the same real interest rate. This implies that the shock
changes their consumption proles almost proportionately in the short and
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medium term. The expenditure-switching e¤ect induces an increase in rela-
tive domestic consumption. In addition, the income of domestic households
is temporarily high and the domestic households have an incentive to save
part of this extra income by running a current account surplus in the short
term (see panel (e) in Figure 1).
Panel (a) shows that, with higher medium-term wealth, domestic house-
holds choose to decrease their labour supply, consequently decreasing do-
mestic output in the medium term. A fall in the supply of domestic goods
causes a small improvement in the domestic terms of trade in the medium
term. The risk premium in UIP that is a function of the level of debt forces
bond holdings in the long term to return to their initial levels. Therefore, in
the medium term, domestic households use accumulated wealth to nance
consumption and their bond holdings decrease gradually over time. In the
long term, the bond holding of domestic households have returned to zero.
Therefore, the wealth e¤ect of bond holdings dies out and the economy re-
verts to the initial steady state in the long term. This is in contrast with
the Obstfeld-Rogo¤model, where a money supply shock has permanent real
e¤ects, because of permanent changes in international wealth allocations.
Panel (h) in Figure 1 illustrates that the foreign central bank decreases
the interest rate in the short term. This is a response to deation and the
fall in output. In the medium term, the foreign central bank increases the
interest rate due to ination and the increase in output.
Table 1 and Panel (f) in Figure 1 show that domestic monetary expansion
decreases domestic utility in the short term, but increases it in the medium
term. The reason for the fall in short-term welfare is that the accumulation of
external assets and the deterioration in the domestic terms of trade (caused
by the exchange rate depreciation) together imply that domestic consumption
increases less than proportionally to output (employment). In the medium
term, domestic utility increases. Deaccumulation of domestic wealth allows
consumption to be higher than output (recall equation (17)). This current
account e¤ect and the improvement in the terms of trade have a favourable
e¤ect on consumption and, consequently, on welfare in the medium term.
In the long term, the shock is neutral and, therefore does not have welfare
e¤ects.
In the beginning, the sign of foreign welfare e¤ects is a mirror image of do-
mestic ones: The domestic shock increases foreign welfare in the short term,
but reduces it in the medium term. The short-term welfare gain is caused
by an increase in consumption and a fall in employment (output). Foreign
consumption increases despite a fall in output due to an improvement in its
terms of trade and the accumulation of net external debt. In the medium
term, foreign households, with lower wealth, work more and output increases.
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This causes an increase in the supply of foreign goods and, therefore a dete-
rioration of the foreign terms of trade. This terms of trade e¤ect increases
foreign consumption and welfare. In addition, foreign households must run a
trade balance surplus to be able to pay back the debt. This current account
channel reinforces the terms of trade channel, and consequently consumption
falls, despite an increase in output. Therefore, foreign welfare decreases in
the medium term.
Table 1 demonstrates that domestic monetary policy increases world util-
ity in the short term, but decreases it in the medium term. The liquidity
e¤ect of monetary policy increases world output closer to its e¢ cient level.
Since the initial output level is ine¢ ciently low, this automatically increases
world welfare in the short term. In the medium term, ination has decreased
the real wage below the initial steady-state level and the labour supply, and
consequently output falls relative to the initial steady state. This reduces
world welfare in the medium term.
Most of the main results of this exercise are in line with the Obstfeld-
Rogo¤ model that analyses the e¤ects of a permanent shock to the money
supply, if their long-term results are compared with the medium-term results
of this paper.5 One of their main results is that the DPV of the change
in utility is identical in the two countries. Table 1 shows that this is the
outcome of this model as well. In the case of the domestic economy, the
medium-term welfare benets from higher consumption and lower labour
supply dominate short-term welfare losses. On the other hand, in the foreign
country, the medium-term welfare losses from lower consumption and higher
labour supply are dominated by the short-term welfare benets from higher
consumption and lower labour supply.
In an extension to the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model, Tervala (2010) analyses
the evolution of welfare over time in the case of a money supply shock. That
work nds that a domestic money supply shock has a beggar-thyself e¤ect
in the short term, but a beggar-thy-neighbour e¤ect in the long term. The
results of this paper are consistent with those ndings, if long-term results
are compared with the medium-term results of this paper, rea¢ rming the
claim that monetary expansion is a beggar-thyself (beggar-thy-neighbour)
policy in the short (medium) term.
5An exception to the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ (1995) model is that the nominal exchange rate
does not follow the random walk. In the OR model, the relative money supplies and
the consumption di¤erential between the countries determine the nominal exchange rate.
Because these are constant, the nominal exchange rate must be constant as well.
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3.3 Welfare E¤ects when the Low Cross-Country Sub-
stitutability is Low
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Tille (2001) show that the DPV of the change
in utility greatly depends on the cross-country substitutability in the case of
a money supply shocks. In addition, Engler and Tervala (2010) show that
welfare e¤ects over time also depend on this elasticity. In this section, I study
the dependence of the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy on the cross-country
substitutability. Figure 2 (on page 27) illustrates impulse responses to the
same monetary shock as in the previous section, in the cases of  = 1 and
 = 0:5. I rst focus on the case of  = 1, and then analyse the case of
 = 0:5. Tables 1 and 2 also show welfare e¤ects in the case of  = 3, but
this case is not discussed.
Panel (f) in Figure 2 shows that the behaviour of the nominal exchange
rate is quite similar to the basic case ( = 6). The behaviour of the do-
mestic interest rate, which is not shown in Figure 2, is almost the same in
the previous case. The shock dominates the central banks decisions and a
di¤erent output gap, for instance, has little inuence on monetary policy. In
addition, the behaviour of the foreign interest rate changes only a little. For
these reasons, exchange rate overshooting and gradual appreciation to the
initial level are similar to the basic case.
As shown by Tille (2001), the cross-country substitutability captures the
sensitivity of the consumption allocation between domestic and foreign goods
with respect to the terms of trade. It therefore determines whether the
consumption switching towards domestic goods following a deterioration in
the domestic terms of trade is large enough to increase the sales revenues
of domestic households, relative to foreign households. If  > 1, ( < 1),
domestic and foreign goods are substitutes (complements) and a deterioration
in the terms of trade increases (reduces) the sales revenues. In addition, 
equals the sum of the export and import elasticities, with respect to the
terms of trade. Therefore, if  > 1 ( < 1), the Marshall-Lerner condition
holds (is violated) and a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate causes a
current account surplus (decit).
Panel (e) in Figure 2 illustrates that monetary policy does not cause
current account imbalances in the case of  = 1. This is consistent with
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Tille (2001). In this case, the increase in
demand for domestic goods does not increase the relative sales revenues of
domestic households, and consequently there is no incentive to lend and
borrow internationally. The current account channel is therefore absent in
this case.
The DPV of the change in utility is consistent with Corsetti and Pesenti
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(2001) and Tille (2001): Expansionary monetary policy is beggar-thyself, as
gains in domestic output are o¤set by deteriorating terms of trade. Since
the current account channel is absent in their models and money is neutral
in the long term, the overall welfare e¤ect is entirely driven by short-term
welfare e¤ects. In this and in their model(s), in the short-term, a deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade implies that a monetary shock causes an increase
in domestic output without an equivalent increase in consumption. There-
fore domestic utility falls. A weaker expenditure switching e¤ect towards
domestic goods, however, implies that the increase in domestic output (em-
ployment) is smaller. Domestic welfare therefore falls by less than in the
basic case in the short term. This is consistent with Engler and Tervala
(2010), who analyse the evolution of welfare over time in the case of a money
supply shock.
Figure 2 and Table 1 reveal a noteworthy result: In the medium term,
monetary policy is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy in the case of 1   < ,
despite the fall in the DPV of welfare. In the medium term, the terms of
trade improve. This causes an increase in domestic consumption without an
equivalent increase in output. Consequently, domestic welfare increases. The
change in welfare is, however, much smaller than in the cases of  = 3 or
 = 6. The reason is that deaccumulation of debt also increases medium-
term utility, in those cases. The increase in foreign welfare is induced by
improving foreign terms of trade. Finally, Table 2 shows that the domestic
shock reduces world utility in the medium term due to a fall in world output.
The next step is to discuss the international welfare e¤ects of monetary
policy in the case of  = 0:5. In this case ( < 1), domestic and foreign goods
are complements, which means that an increase in demand for domestic goods
is followed by an increase in demand for foreign goods. Therefore, a monetary
shock causes a positive cross-country correlation in output.
A monetary shock reduces domestic welfare in the short term, notwith-
standing a short-term current account decit. If the Marshall-Lerner condi-
tion does not hold, a deterioration in the terms of trade reduces the domestic
sales revenue. The income of domestic households is then temporarily low
and the households smooth consumption via a current account decit in the
short term. On one hand, an increase in consumption via a short-term debt
accumulation tends to increase utility. On the other hand, the deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade reduces utility. The terms of e¤ect dominates
the current account e¤ect to an extent that the increase in consumption is
much smaller than the increase in output in the short term, and consequently
domestic welfare reduces.
Table 1 demonstrates that the assumption of  < 1, reverses the welfare
e¤ects of monetary policy in the medium term relative to the other cases:
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Monetary policy is beggar-thyself rather than beggar-thy-neighbour. In the
medium term, domestic households must run a trade balance surplus to be
able to pay back the external debt. This current account channel tends to
reduce domestic utility. On the other hand, the terms of trade improve. The
current account e¤ect dominates the terms of trade e¤ect to an extent that
the fall in consumption is higher than the fall in output, and therefore utility
reduces in the medium term.
Engler and Tervala (2010) analyse the evolution of welfare over time in
the case of  < 1 following a money supply shock. They nd that a domestic
money supply shock has a beggar-thyself e¤ect in the short and long term.
The results of this paper are consistent with those ndings if their long-term
results are compared with the medium-term results of this paper, rea¢ rming
the claim that monetary expansion is always a beggar-thyself policy if the
Marshall-Lerner condition does not hold.
Table 1 and 2 demonstrate that the cross-country substitutability does
not a¤ect the changes in world utility. At the world level, all that is left is the
liquidity e¤ect of monetary policy. The terms of trade and current account
channels just determine allocation of pains and gains of monetary policy over
time between the countries. The liquidity e¤ect of monetary policy increases
world output closer to its e¢ cient level and increases short-term and overall
utility. Temporarily, low real wage reduces world output and welfare in the
medium term.
Bluedorn and Bowdler (2011) use the VAR method to empirically esti-
mate the e¤ects of a contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock (which raises
the U.S. T-bill rate) on U.S and non-U.S. G7 countries. They nd the fol-
lowing. First, that a monetary contraction causes an impact appreciation of
the dollar that is followed by a gradual return roughly to the initial level.
Second, there is positive interest rate pass-through from U.S. to non-U.S.
G7 countries. U.S. monetary policy, however, creates deviations from UIP.
Third, the response of U.S. output is negative, and non-U.S. G7 countries
output shows a mixed initial response (some positive and some negative).
In the short term, the PCP version of the present model is able to capture
these open economy consequences of U.S. monetary policy, because the e¤ects
of contractionary monetary policy would be mirror images of those reported
in this exercise. Non-U.S. G7 countries might have di¤erent cross-country
elasticities with the United States, which might partly explain some positive
and some negative foreign output responses.
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4 Welfare E¤ects of Monetary Policy under
Local Currency Pricing
4.1 Modications to the Model
Motivated by the evidence of partial exchange rate pass-through to import
prices, weak empirical support for the law of one price in internationally
traded goods and the sources of real exchange rate uctuations, many re-
searchers, including Betts and Devereux (2000, 2001), have assumed that
export prices are set in the consumerscurrency. Following this modelling
approach, rms in each country can now "price-to-market," and these rms
set their prices in the local currency of the buyer. I refer to these rms as
local currency pricing (LCP) rms.
In the presence of LCP, the prices of goods are not necessarily equated
across countries in the short and medium term, and PPP does not have to
hold. Therefore, not only does a risk premium in UIP lead real interest rates
to diverge across countries, but so does a deviation from PPP.
The equations of the model in the case of LCP are the same as earlier,
unless they are explicitly discussed. However, only the equations describing
the home country are shown. Under PCP, the cross-country substitutability
is a key parameter for the international transmission of money shocks because
it governs the strength of the expenditure switching e¤ect. On the other
hand, in the case of LCP, the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate
carries no expenditure-switching e¤ect in the short term. To keep the LCP
model as simple as possible, I focus on the case where the cross-country
substitutability is equal to the within-country substitutability, as in Betts
and Devereux (2000). Therefore, the consumption index (2) is replaced with
the following consumption index:
Ct =
Z 1
0
ct(z)
 1
 dz
 
 1
; (18)
where c (z) is consumption of good z and  > 1 now measures the elasticity
of substitution between di¤erentiated goods. The home country CPI is now
Pt =
Z n
0
pht (z)
1  dz +
Z 1
n
pft (z)
1  dz
 1
1 
: (19)
For domestic LCP rms, total output is divided between output sold in
the home country, xt (z), and output sold abroad, vt (z). Prots of LCP rms
are given by
LCPt (z) = p
h
t (z)xt (z) + Stp
h
t (z) vt (z)  wt`t (z) ; (20)
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The demands for the domestic goods are given by
xt (z) =

pht (z)
Pt
 
nCt; (21)
vt (z) =

pht (z)
P t
 
(1  n)Ct : (22)
Equations (21) and (22) show the demand for a domestic LCP rm in the
home and foreign country, respectively.
In the absence of nominal rigidities, domestic LCP rms would maximize
LCPt (z) with respect to pt (z) and p
h
t (z). This would imply that
pt (z) = Stp
h
t (z) =

   1wt:
This equation shows that without nominal rigidities, the law of one price
holds and good z is sold at the same price in both markets, when expressed
in the same currency.
With the Calvo-price setting, the representative domestic LCP rm seeks
to maximize:
max
pht (z);p
h
t (z)
V LCPt (z) = Et
1X
s=t
s tQt;sLCPt (z) ;
The result is that the pricing rules are given by
pht (z) =


   1
 EtP1s=t s tQt;s CsPs 1Phs   ws
Et
P1
s=t 
s tQt;s

Cs
Ps

1
Phs
  : (23)
pht (z) =


   1
 EtP1s=t s tQt;s CsP s Cs  1P s   ws
Et
P1
s=t 
s tQt;sCs

1
P s
 
Ss
: (24)
The log-linear versions of equations (23) and (24) can be written as
p^ht (z) = Etp^
h
t+1(z) + (1  )w^t;
p^ht (z) = Etp^
h
t+1(z) + (1  )(w^t   St): (25)
Equation (25) shows that domestic export prices, expressed in the foreign
currency, do not change when the nominal exchange rate changes unexpect-
edly. This implies that exchange rate pass-through to export prices is zero
for those LCP goods whose prices cannot be adjusted.
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The consolidated budget constraint of the home economy can be written
as,
PtCt;= p
h
t (z)xt (z) + Stp
h
t (z) vt (z) + (1 + it)Dt 1  Dt: (26)
In the LCP version of the model, the elasticity of substitution between
di¤erentiated goods is set to 6. Otherwise, the choice of parameter values is
the same as in the PCP version of the model.
4.2 Results
Figure 3 (on page 28) plots impulse response functions to domestic mone-
tary expansion under LCP. In Figure 4 the dashed lines plot the e¤ects of
monetary policy under LCP and the solid lines under PCP in the case where
 =  = 6. Note that the only di¤erence in these two versions of the model
is the currency of export pricing.
Panel (f) in Figure 4 shows a noteworthy result: The behaviour of the
nominal exchange rate under LCP is quite similar under PCP. If monetary
shocks are modelled as a shock to the interest rate rule the currency of
export pricing does not seem to be important for exchange rate dynamics.
This is in sharp contrast to the result of Betts and Devereux (2000). They
nd that a shock to the money supply under LCP generates overshooting is
the consumption elasticity of money demand if smaller than one, while the
nominal exchange rate follows a random walk under PCP.
On one hand, the behaviour of the domestic interest rate under LCP is
almost the same as in the PCP case. The shock dominates the central banks
policymaking, and a di¤erent output gap and ination have very limited
impact on interest-rate decisions. On the other hand, monetary policy in the
foreign country is very di¤erent than under PCP. Due to a positive output
gap and ination, the foreign central bank raises the interest rate in the
short term. In the medium term, it lowers the interest rate in response to
a small negative output gap and deation. The magnitude of the domestic
interest rate movement is, however, much larger. Therefore, exchange rate
overshooting and gradual appreciation to the initial level are quite similar to
the PCP case.
The short-term e¤ects of monetary policy are consistent with the nd-
ings of Betts and Devereux (2000): A monetary shock improves the terms of
trade, increases domestic welfare at the neighbour expense, causes a positive
(negative) cross-country correlation of output (consumption) and does not
cause current account imbalances. The output e¤ect is primarily determined
by the direct demand increase by domestic households. When exchange rate
pass-through to import prices is zero, the increase in demand is equally split
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between the two countries and output increases by the same amount in both
countries.
An exchange rate depreciation induces only a distribution of income to-
ward the home country, increasing domestic consumption and reducing for-
eign consumption. The departure from PPP implies the di¤erential move-
ment in real interest rates across countries and the domestic real interest
rates falls. Domestic households would like to save part of high income by
running a current account surplus in the short term, but the fall in the real
interest rate encourages them to consume it in the present. Therefore, the
low real interest rate does not encourage them to lend and LCP eliminates
current imbalances. Under LCP, an exchange rate depreciation improves the
terms of trade. Therefore, the positive e¤ect of higher consumption is larger
than the negative e¤ect caused by higher employment (output). So the home
country may improve its welfare, at the expense of its neighbour.
Table 3: Welfare E¤ects under LCP and PCP
dU1 dU

1 dU
W
6 dU6 dU

6 dU
W
6
LCP 0.016 -0.013 0.0019 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0001
PCP ( = 6) -0.23 0.027 0.0019 0.18 -0.019 -0.0001
Table3 and panel (f) in Figure 3 show that the short-term beggar-thy-
neighbour welfare e¤ect is reversed in the medium term, when monetary
policy has a beggar-thyself welfare e¤ect. After the initial depreciation of
the nominal exchange rate, it gradually appreciates. This (anticipated) ap-
preciation causes a weak deterioration of the domestic terms of trade in the
medium term, which causes a fall in real consumption and consequently in
welfare. The ip side is a higher foreign consumption due to the terms of
trade behaviour. This has a small positive e¤ect on foreign welfare.
Table 4: DPV of the Change in Utility under LCP and PCP
dUDPV dU

DPV dU
W
DPV
LCP 0.023 -0.019 0.0023
PCP ( = 6) 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023
In the model of Betts and Devereux (2000), a money supply shock is
neutral in the medium and long term. Therefore, its welfare e¤ects are driven
entirely by short-term e¤ects. Although in the present model adjustment
dynamics are more complex and monetary policy reduces domestic utility
in the medium term, the models generate the same overall welfare e¤ect
(see Table 4): Monetary expansion under LCP is a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy, because the domestic country can improve its terms of trade at the
neighbours expense.
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The key to the beggar-thy-neighbour result is that the domestic coun-
try can improve its terms of trade at the neighbours expense. It is worth
emphasising that the LCP model predicts that a currency depreciation is as-
sociated with an improvement in the countrys terms of trade. This is incon-
sistent with the empirical evidence of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000), showing
that currency depreciations are associated with deteriorations rather than
improvements of the terms of trade.
Finally, Table 5 shows the dependence of the sign of the welfare e¤ect of
monetary policy on the currency of export pricing and the cross-country sub-
stitutability. It shows that neither of them has impact on world utility: It is a
robust result that monetary expansion increases short-term and overall world
utility, but reduces medium-term utility. How the pains and gains of mone-
tary policy are divided between countries over time, however, greatly depends
on the currency of export pricing and the cross-country substitutability.
Table 5: Sign of the Welfare E¤ect of a Domestic Monetary Expansion
dU1 dU

1 dU
W
1 dU6 dU6 dU
W
6 dUDPV dU

DPV dU
W
DPV
PCP,  = 0:5 - + + - + - - + +
PCP,  = 1 or 3 - + + + - - - + +
PCP,  = 6 - + + + - - + + +
LCP + - + - + - + - +
5 Conclusions
This paper focuses on the international welfare e¤ects of monetary policy, in
the context of an open-economy model with imperfect competition and nom-
inal rigidities. The earlier literature has shown that the currency of export
pricing and the cross-country substitutability have signicant implications
for the overall welfare e¤ects of monetary policy, in the case where monetary
policy is modelled in terms of the central banks control of the money supply.
This study shows that results do not change in any way if monetary policy
in modelled in terms of an interest rate rule.
Modelling monetary policy in terms of the Taylor rule with interest rate
smoothing, however, renders the evolution of welfare over time richer. For in-
stance, under LCP, an increase in the money supply is a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy in the short term without any other welfare e¤ects (Betts and Devereux
2000). This study shows that a decrease in the interest rate, under LCP, has
at rst a beggar-thy-neighbour e¤ect, and after that a beggar-thyself e¤ect,
before monetary policy becomes neutral.
The study also shows that although the e¤ects of monetary policy on
overall welfare can have the same sign in di¤erent situations, the merits and
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demerits of policy come in di¤erent time horizons. For instance, in the case
where the cross-country substitutability is equal to the within-country substi-
tutability, monetary policy increases domestic overall utility both under LCP
and PCP. However, monetary policy has a beggar-thy-neighbour (beggar-
thyself) e¤ect under LCP (PCP) in the short term, whereas welfare e¤ects
are reversed in the medium term. Understanding the evolution of welfare
over time should be an important part of carefully implemented monetary
policy although overall welfare e¤ects are likely to be more essential.
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Figure 1: Dynamic E¤ects of a Shock to the Domestic Monetary Policy Rule
in the Basic Case ( =  = 6)
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Figure 2: Dynamic E¤ects of a Domestic Monetary Shock: The Role of
Cross-Country Elasticity
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Figure 3: Dynamic E¤ects of a Shock to the Domestic Monetary Policy Rule
under Local Currency Pricing
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Figure 4: Dynamic E¤ects a Domestic Monetary Shock under Local Currency
Pricing and Producer Currency Pricing ( = 6)
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